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Designing-In Crime by Designing-Out the Social? Situational Crime 
Prevention and the intensification of harmful subjectivities 
Thomas Raymen 
Abstract 
Situational crime prevention and CPTED strategies have been broadly criticised within much of 
theoretical criminology. Most of these criticisms dismantle the notion of the fully rational 
criminal actor, questioning the shaky ground of classical criminology on which its claims are 
made. Through positioning hyper-regulated city centres as post-social, post-political ‘non-
places’ of consumption, this article builds upon these critiques arguing that attempts to ‘design 
out crime’ create environments which are not only doomed to fail in their primary objective, but 
actively create environments which perpetuate and exacerbate the decline in symbolic 
efficiency and the narcissistic, competitive-individualist and asocial subjectivities which, as 
recent work from left-wing criminology consistently reveals, have the capacity to significantly 
contribute to forms of harm, crime and deviance.  
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Introduction 
The policy strategies of situational crime prevention (SCP) and their attempts to 
prevent crime by creating ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972) have been a major source 
of annoyance for much of theoretical criminology. Much-needed critiques have been 
levelled at these strategies, with arguments centring primarily on the shortcomings of 
the neo-classical  rational choice and routine activity theories which underpin these 
measures (de Haan and Vos, 2003; Hayward, 2004; 2004b; 2007; 2012). In particular, 
Keith Hayward draws upon a wealth of literature across cultural criminology, social 
psychology and consumer and leisure studies to introduce a much more nuanced 
consideration of emotion, affect and the conflict between the irrationality of much 
crime, deviance and leisure with SCP’s conceptualisation of the ‘rational man’ 
(Featherstone, 1987; Hayward and Hobbs, 2007; Katz, 1988; Lyng, 1990; Miles, 1996). 
While the early ideas of Jane Jacobs (1961) and her notion of ‘the eyes on the street’ 
have much merit, they have been misappropriated and ill-applied by rational-choice 
theories and SCP. In placing faith in a misguided conceptualisation of the dispassionate 
rational man, rather than the more culturally and experientially-attuned theoretical 
accounts of cultural criminology, it has been argued that policy initiatives such as SCP 
and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPtED from hereon) offer false 
promises of their ability to control much crime and deviance.  
These critiques, while extremely valuable in their own right, focus solely upon SCP’s 
simplistic theorisation of crime, its failure to acknowledge the social, cultural and 
emotional complexity of criminality and thus, the flawed basis on which it attempts to 
sustainably prevent crime and deviance (de Haan and Vos, 2003; Hayward, 2007). 
However, rarely within the criminological literature has there been much consideration 
of what kind of ‘public subjectivities’ the contemporary SCP-laden environment 
cultivates and what importance this might have for criminological theory. This article 
intends to take existing critiques a step further by arguing that SCP’s attempts to ‘design 
out crime’ are not only doomed to fail in their primary objective, but actively create 
urban environments which perpetuate and exacerbate the competitive-individualist 
and asocial subjectivities which, as recent work within left-wing criminology has shown, 
underpins much crime and deviance ranging from sink estates to corporate boardrooms 
(Hall, 2012; Hall et al, 2008; Smith, 2014; Winlow and Hall, 2006; Treadwell et al, 2013).  
Looking at the social and historical origins of defensible space and ‘fear of the other’, 
this article will first examine how these anxieties and fears have become exacerbated in 
late modernity and, in the context of global neoliberal capitalism, woven themselves 
into the physical fabric of both the public and private realms through SCP (Atkinson and 
Blandy, 2007; Hayward, 2004). The article will then go on to look at the kinds of spatial 
environments these measures create, and consider their impact upon how we 
collectively view and engage with the ‘public realm’ and the effects this might have 
more broadly upon social solidarity and symbolic efficiency. Finally, the article will turn 
to recent developments in ultra-realist criminological theory (Winlow and Hall, 2015) 
to consider the parallels between the public subjectivities that contemporary urban 
environments engender and some of the key social and psychoanalytical processes 
which this recent theoretical and empirical research suggests is vital to the motivational 
drive to criminality.   
This article does not intend to suggest that the crime prevention strategies of SCP and 
the environments they create are the direct cause of crime. Such an argument would 
ludicrously ignore that crime is a multi-factorial phenonmenon which, like SCP, is 
underpinned by much larger social, cultural and political-economic structures and 
forces. However, as has been argued elsewhere, criminology must begin to look at the 
underlying drives, subjectivities and motivations to commit crime if it is to adequately 
explain the expanding forms of harmful behaviours under neoliberal capitalism (Hall, 
2012). Therefore, this article merely wishes to question the extent to which, far from 
being a solution, the strategies of SCP and CPtED actively contribute to the problem. Put 
simply: when we employ SCP and CPtED strategies in our city spaces, are we designing-
in the decline of symbolic efficiency and the development of potentially harmful 
subjectivities by designing-out the social? 
  
The Retreat from the Social: Contemporary and Historical Contexts 
 
There has been a wealth of literature about the social withdrawal from public life, 
where ‘being in public’ has involved a retreat into the self, viewing the stranger as a 
threat or danger rather than as a source of potential social enrichment, enjoyment or 
inspiration (Baumgartner, 1988; de Cauter, 2004; Sennett, 1977). Most prominently, the 
rich have been identified as retreating from public life, using their wealth and resources 
to live more exclusive and shielded lives away from the dangerous ‘other’ (Atkinson, 
2008; Atkinson and Smith, 2012). More recent research indicates that the behaviours 
and movements of the rich which are supported by SCP measures allow them to 
simultaneously be both ‘in’ the city whilst also entirely disentangled from its street-level 
reality—spatially and culturally detached from those marred by the difficulties of 
neoliberal austerity and widening social inequality (Atkinson, 2008; 2015). Rowland 
Atkinson contends that the super-rich live in a ‘plutocratic cloud’ enabled by an array of 
security-focused ‘shielded mobilities’ to live ‘nodally’ in a network of fortified and gated 
enclaves of the home, work and exclusive members’ societies which consist of ‘people 
like us’, thereby avoiding unpleasant encounters with poverty and hardship (Atkinson, 
2015)1. 
However it is not only the super-rich who have retreated from public life in our cities. 
On a more mundane level, public space can often be relatively bereft of social 
interaction and really existing social space (Sennett, 1977). One can see this if we 
observe the behaviours of fellow urban-dwellers as they go about their business in the 
city.  We move quickly through train stations and high streets, nervously zig-zagging 
along to avoid ‘charity muggers’, homeless beggars or Big Issue sellers. Many city 
councils demand that busking musicians apply for permits to perform on the street, 
with city council guidelines offering a list of ‘do’s and don’ts’ in which buskers cannot 
perform for longer than two hours and must cease performing if a member of the public 
deems them a nuisance or disturbance. We plug in our iPods and close our eyes on the 
train to shut out the world around us, deterring any oddly invasive stranger who might 
penetrate our personal ‘microspheres of spatial sovereignty’ to start up a conversation 
(Sloterdijk, 2011). De Cauter (2003) has described this state of affairs in contemporary 
society as a ‘capsular civilisation’, characterised by the gated community, the blacked-
out SUV and the general defensive mode of being in public—a public and implied ‘Do 
Not Disturb’ sign (de Cauter, 2003; Marvin and Graham, 2001). 
The retreat from public life, taken in collaboration with these latest developments in 
theoretical criminology, seems to offer an unparalleled opportunity to present new 
critiques of SCP, the urban environments they create and their impact upon public 
subjectivities. As we live in urban environments which are physically and 
architecturally designed and governed to encourage vigilance, suspicion, and the steady 
flow and movement of people, these everyday micro-practices of avoidance cause social 
relations to become increasingly fluid, transient and anonymous, with a lack of social 
integration and a general interpersonal indifference among strangers (Baumgartner, 
1988).  
However, this retreat from, and indifference to, ‘public’ life is rooted in long historical 
processes. The public retreat which has become a popular topic for geographers, 
urbanists and sociologists did not begin with SCP, but has only been exacerbated by it in 
                                                          
1
 However, as Atkinson and Smith’s (2012) analysis of homicides within gated communities; neutralising the 
criminogenic dangers of the city by withdrawing into the affluence of gated communities offer no guarantees 
of increased safety—real or imagined.  
the contemporary context of an increasingly individualistic culture of consumer 
capitalism. One of Richard Sennett’s seminal texts, The Fall of Public Man (1977), 
discusses the withdrawal from the social in the context of the diminishing boundary 
between the public and private realms. Sennett argues that an obsession with knowing 
oneself, experiencing authentic feeling and genuine intimacy in interpersonal relations 
irrespective of the realm in which it took place has skewed the balance between public 
and private life. As this article will observe later, this obsession with oneself and 
knowing oneself is arguably reflected, in contemporary times, within the individualistic 
identity project of consumerism which pervades and forms the economy for post-
industrial UK cities. 
Sennett maintains that within the intimate arena of privacy with family and friends, one 
does not require the same characteristics as one does from public life with strangers. 
Public life involves the ‘wearing of masks’ and interacting with one another through the 
performance of impersonal formalities of public interaction. However the fascination 
with individual personalities and the belief in disclosing the self as a moral good in and 
of itself has superimposed the private realm onto the public. Consequently, public life 
was seen to be meaningless, fake and empty of authenticity. However, the confusion of 
the private and public realms and the superimposition of the disclosure of the authentic 
self and character also produced significant anxiety and distress. The individual self is 
considered a precious commodity to be protected delicately. But with the cultural 
command to be authentic—or rather to not be fake through the impersonal routines of 
social relations—the only protection against one’s self being intruded upon by others 
was to stop feeling and withdraw from public and social interaction altogether:  
“Silence in public became the only way one could experience public life, especially 
street life, without feeling overwhelmed…There grew up the notion that strangers 
had no right to speak to each other; that each man possessed as a public right an 
invisible shield, a right to be left alone. Public behaviour was a matter of 
observation, of passive participation” (Sennett, 1977: 27). 
Consequently, through the blurring of boundaries between the public and private realm 
and the absorption in the self, the stranger came to be seen as a threat and a source of 
intrusion, anxiety and stress rather than as a source of social enrichment. This historical 
reorientation of public life serves as a backdrop for examining how SCP and CPtED 
measures design spaces so that they are deliberately absent of anything resembling 
actually existing public sociability, in which public space becomes empty space to move 
through, rather than remain in.  
Consumer Capitalism and SCP: Creating ‘Non-Places’ 
The notion of situational crime prevention, defensible space and the protection of 
property from danger has long historical roots. As Atkinson and Blandy (2007) point 
out, the right to own property and treating the home as a personal sanctuary dates back 
in socio-legal discourse to the 18th century, with Lord Chief Justice Coke coining the now 
famous line that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress” (ibid. 2007: 
445). Changes in the political-economic landscape have, as many scholars argue, 
escalated a more general perception of risk and social fear (Bauman, 2007; Beck, 1992). 
This, along with property ownership taking on a heightened importance within the 
social and cultural imagination where it carries not only the use value of being a place of 
comfort to live, sleep and engage in the intimate privacy of family, but value as a 
speculative financial asset and ‘lifetime investment’, has resulted in home ownership 
becoming an increasingly defensive and paranoid process. The home is now more 
hostile and impermeable than ever, with high fences, locked gates, burglar alarm 
systems (both working and fake), timed lights and ‘Beware of dog’ signs becoming 
normal features of even the safest neighbourhoods. Indeed, Oscar Newman’s (1972) 
ideas of ‘defensible space’ upon which many SCP measures are based were originally 
directed toward changing the residential environment.  
  
However, these defensive features of SCP have expanded beyond the domestic sphere 
and embedded themselves both subtly and explicitly within the public realm and into 
individuals’ everyday lives and movements (see Hayward, 2004: 138-139) for 
discussion of the overt nature of many SCP measures). Just as the increased prevalence 
and sophistication of defensive home ownership has roots in social and cultural 
processes, neither has the employment of SCP into the physical design of urban spaces 
been implemented within a social, political or economic vacuum. Paradigmatic shifts in 
the global economy have resulted in considerable socio-economic, cultural and urban 
change in the United Kingdom which have significantly impacted the way in which the 
individual subjectively experiences and engages with social and spatial reality. The 
dissolution of the traditional forms of industrial employment and the steady move 
towards an economy predicated upon financial services, leisure and consumption over 
the last four decades is, for some, comparable in significance to the agricultural and 
industrial revolutions of previous centuries (Hobsbawm, 1976; 1996; Smith, 2014).  
For cities, this involved a historic shift in municipal governance and the physical and 
spatial landscapes of city centres (Minton, 2012). As the new orthodoxy of neoliberal 
capitalism pervaded, post-industrial UK cities had to make what Winlow and Hall 
(2013: 124) describe as the shift from municipal socialism to municipal capitalism. This 
has involved local authorities fleeing from social democratic municipal governance and 
throwing their hopes into the bosom of the market. The governing logic dictated a need 
to ‘regenerate’ city centres as commercial spaces of consumption, leisure and business 
in order to make them relevant with affluent young professionals and to make these 
cities economically viable and competitive in a new post-industrial economic reality 
(Minton, 2012).  This can be seen in the creation of the ‘Business Improvement Districts’ 
(BID), in which businesses in a demarcated area pay an independent limited company2 a 
levy to fund the improvement of privately owned business in the area and to collaborate 
in responsibility for the area to maximise commercial interest.  
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 See http://www.newcastlene1ltd.com/ for an example of a BID in Newcastle upon Tyne 
In keeping with a broader neoliberal theme of individualisation and responsibilisation, 
SCP has been a popular measure in which the basic premise is for local authorities, 
individuals and businesses to pragmatically equip their spheres of spatial sovereignty 
with deterrents which do not offer the rational opportunistic criminal actor an ‘easy 
target’ (Clarke, 1997; Hough et al, 1980). This can take on a whole range of forms. 
Architects design and redesign city spaces based upon Newman’s (1972) notion of 
‘defensible space’: open, well-lit, highly visible and relatively empty spaces which aid 
the flow of pedestrian traffic. Property owners, businesses and developers equip these 
spaces with barriers, prohibitive signs, alarm systems and CCTV cameras. The police 
have attempted to recapture the notion of community policing, employing the public as 
a vigilant source of SCP by imploring them to remain vigilant and report suspicious 
behaviour in train stations and airports3  and even carry pepper spray, extending the 
imperative for safety and a defensive mind-set to the individual (Ferrell et al, 2008).   
The central focus of this article, of course, is to explore what impact such measures have 
had on our public subjectivities. Such measures have arguably had a significant 
influence upon the spatial ‘ecology of fear’ (Davis, 1998). ‘Public life’ has, for a long time, 
been considered an important aspect of progressive societies, forcing individuals to 
move beyond the defensive and regressive privatism of the home and cast themselves 
among a diverse sea of humanity. In doing so, public life encouraged us to learn and 
encounter social difference on an open and level plane, possibly developing socially and 
emotionally stimulating bonds between people and places and cultivating a crucial 
sense of the ‘social’ that extended beyond the self (Sennett, 1977). As urban spaces 
expand and Western societies revolve increasingly around the city (Amin and Thrift, 
2002) and with the increase in globalisation, migration and the ever-increasing density 
of urban populations, it would seem logical to assume that we have become more adept 
at bringing organic and dynamic social relations into the realm of public life. Many 
liberal scholars maintain that the city offers a vibrant and rich spatial arena of social 
relations. Recently, Elijah Anderson (2011) has argued that even in highly unequal and 
spatially segregated societies, the city is a dynamic plane which enables mutual 
tolerance, trust and social relationships which cross class, ethnic and cultural 
boundaries to form a ‘cosmopolitan canopy’. However, is it an accurate reflection of 
reality to conflate physical proximity and diversity with an organic and dynamic 
actually existing social space and public subjectivities which welcome the 
indeterminacy and spontaneity that comes with it?  
Many of the central sites within city centres are far from organic places which embrace 
the spontaneity of social action. They are artificial environments, carefully constructed, 
governed and maintained in such a way that they seem to have escaped the social (Augé, 
2008). The shopping mall—perhaps the quintessential landmark of late modernity—is a 
sterile and homogenised environment which is carefully maintained and governed in 
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 A prime example of this are the regular announcements at train platforms to ‘report anything suspicious to a 
member of staff’. This is part of the Metropolitan Police’s ‘If you suspect it, report it’ counter-terrorism 
publicity campaign http://content.met.police.uk/Campaign/nationwidecounterterrorism  
such a way that does not embrace the organic natural texture of public life, but resists 
and corrals it. Security guards and CCTV systems ensure that ‘social’ behaviour is not 
spontaneous, exciting and free to be individually directed, but follows the predictable 
pattern of orderly consumption, precisely so that any disturbances to the contrary 
become immediately visible and noteworthy. The use of homeless spikes ensures that 
even the profile of who enters urban spaces is not organic (Quinn, 2014).  Those without 
the financial means or intent to consume will inevitably detract from the homogenised 
purposeful behaviour (Quinn, 2014). There has been a decline of public benches or even 
bins which would give one cause to stop; driving one small activist group in the Camden 
Borough of London to undertake ‘guerrilla benching’, re-installing their own outdoor 
benches in the spaces where they had previously been removed4. As Mike Davis first 
observed in City of Quartz in (1990), even where benches or public seating do appear in 
shopping malls, bus-stops and train stations, they have been deliberately designed with 
arm-rests and narrow sloping seats to deter young people, the homeless or general 
loiterers from staying there for any prolonged time-period (Davis, 1990; Ferrell et al, 
2008). Even when these spaces attempt to inject some dynamism through musical 
performances or artists, they are not impromptu performers but carefully screened, 
documented and given strict guidelines to follow, where buskers can require permits 
and auditions to play (Ferrell, 2001; Minton, 2012). The urban soundscape is being used 
to drive away undesirable individuals by using high-pitched noise to disperse young 
people (Goodman, 2010; Hayward, 2012).  
In this way, many public spaces reflect a degree of ‘hyperreality’ (Baudrillard, 1994), 
sharing more in common with the carefully orchestrated realm of Disneyland than a 
natural and organic public space (Shearing and Stenning, 1985). Plants are not really 
plants; the barrels of beer in a themed pub whose atmosphere and décor are carefully 
constructed are not barrels but cardboard replicas. Even the open courtyard or piazza 
to an apartment complex, while appearing in form to be a public square for social 
activity, is actually only a ‘pedestrian traffic nexus’ (Sennett, 1977). The apartment 
complex in which I live has such a courtyard, with the building tenants’ committee 
constantly asking management to tighten security on the square to prevent people 
loitering, all justified under the vague banner of tackling ‘anti-social behaviour’ and 
protecting property prices (see Harvey, 2014). The ‘original’ of public social life has 
been copied and modified repetitively over time to such an extent that it has lost or 
forgotten how it is supposed to resemble the original reality.  
These spaces are, effectively, what Marc Augé (2008) terms ‘non-places’, physical 
spaces of transience bereft of social interaction to the extent that they do not possess 
enough significance to be considered ‘places’ at all. Augé (2008: 77-78) uses examples of 
motorways, airports, train stations, supermarkets and retail parks: 
“If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then 
a space that cannot be defined as relational, historical or concerned with identity 
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 http://www.spacehijackers.org/html/projects/guerrillabench/guerrilla.html  
will be a non-place. The hypothesis advanced here is that supermodernity 
produces non-places, meaning spaces which are not themselves anthropological 
places and which, unlike Baudelairean modernity, do not integrate the earlier 
places: instead these are listed, classified, promoted to the status of ‘places of 
memory’, and assigned to a circumscribed and specific position”.  
 
Many of our open public spaces lack this kind of character or meaning, being a very real 
physical space which we occupy and move through whilst having very little content or 
possible meaning to give it any quality of ‘place’. Immediately near the entrance to 
Newcastle Central railway station there is a vast open concrete space which is well-lit, 
spacious, highly visible and completely empty. It is encircled by the railway station, the 
underground metro, a bus stop, a taxi rank, several bars and a Starbucks; merely an 
‘adjoining space’ within the flowing network of urban mobilities ready to take one from 
home to work or leisure (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Blokland and Savage, 2008). In this 
brief ‘negative space’ between the realms of work, private interpersonal activity of 
socialising with close friends in pubs or coffeehouses, there is nothing which would 
prompt one to stop. Smokers occasionally stop idly in this space, striking up a 
conversation with fellow smokers, but even this has become more hazardous with the 
removal of cigarette bins and the posting of a city council officer ready to issue a £75 on-
the-spot fine for anyone dropping cigarette butts. As guided by the directions of 
Newman (1972) and expanded upon in the ‘broken windows’ theory of crime, the image 
of the space is more important than its content.  
 
This is of course by design, underpinned by the logic of SCP. These spaces have become, 
to use Richard Sennett’s terminology, “derivatives of movement” (Sennett, 1977: 14) in 
which the purpose is to pass through, rather than remain in public space. This certainly 
satisfies one of Oscar Newman’s five key elements of defensible space: well-light, highly 
visible adjoining areas which can take one safely from one place to the next (Newman, 
1972). Of course, to achieve this, these spaces have to be designed in such a way as to be 
unremarkable, containing such emptiness and minimalism that they cannot carry any 
meaning at all. They cannot be enjoyed as spaces in and of themselves in the way a 
beautiful public park could be enjoyed. We can see this in the decline of council funding 
for public parks and benches which, as Sennett (1977) notes, is a reversal of the original 
project to build urban parks in the 18th century metropolis. During this era, as public life 
was becoming increasingly diverse and the forum through which strangers could meet, 
going for a pedestrian stroll became a form of relaxation and pleasure. However, with 
changes in the political economy organising the city and leisure through the 
individualistic activities of the consumer market, ‘being in public’ has come to hold little 
social or cultural value, with strolling as a form of relaxation being moved out of the 
urban and toward the countryside and rural areas as tourist pursuits (Harvey, 2012) . 
The public realm, where we must grit our teeth and mix with the potential ‘other’, is a 
dangerous, meaningless place which we must hurry through on to our next personal 
activity before any suspicious stranger penetrates ‘bubble’ of personal space (Sloterdijk, 
2011).   
 
This is not to say that contemporary urban spaces are completely empty of people who 
linger within the public sphere. As referred to earlier, smokers linger in public space but 
such lingering is restricted by both time and space. The lingering smoker is, increasingly, 
packed into demarcated ‘smoking zones’, denoted either by a small painted area or a 
shelter resembling a bus stop. But smokers’ lingering is also limited to the duration of a 
cigarette, with purposeless lingering seen as a nuisance to the flow of people (Hayward, 
2004). Another example of people lingering is those seen sitting and standing outside of 
pubs, bars and café’s in consumer cities. Indeed, neoliberalism can actively encourage 
lingering, but a specific form of purposeful lingering that is only acceptable when in 
conjunction with consumption. This level of lingering and sociability is simply another 
example of an opportunity for narcissistic and competitive individualistic forms of 
sociability which often involve an opportunity to ostentatiously display cultural 
competence by sipping the right kind of alcoholic cocktail or coffee, wearing the right 
clothes or carrying the right shopping bags and attempting to stimulate envy in others to 
elevate the self, a form of egoism which has been shown to be a constituent part of the 
wider subjective driving motivation to harm others (Hall et al, 2008; Raymen and Smith, 
2015; Smith, 2014). While public space may be full of people, such co-presence is a far 
cry from a selfless investment in performing the social in a way which carries lasting, 
collective and communal qualities of love, politics and urban solidarity. This involves an 
embracing of the potential for unexpected and unscripted social engagement which is 
the exact opposite of the atonality we can currently observe (Badiou, 2013; Sennett, 
1970).  
 
Within this limited framework of ‘lingering’, it is difficult to conceive how urban citizens 
might recapture Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to the city’ (1991); if indeed, as David 
Harvey (2012) questions, such a right still exists. Lefebvre’s original conceptualisation of 
the right to the city in 1968 has been used, re-used and distorted so much that it often 
fails to resemble its original meaning. The right to the city, as certain scholars recall, is 
not merely a right to access services or individualistic interests. It is a much broader 
concept which involves the right to change ourselves and our society by changing the 
city and by changing the processes of urbanisation (Harvey, 2008; 2012; Marcuse, 
2009). As David Harvey (2012) remarks, the right to the city is an “empty signifier”. The 
right to the city is defined only by who gets to fill it with meaning who controls how the 
urban and, consequently in a world increasingly revolving around the urban, society 
more generally operates. As Marcuse (2009: 193) writes:  
 
“The homeless person in Los Angeles has not won the right to the city when he is 
allowed to sleep on a park bench in the centre. Much more is involved, and the 
concept is as to a collectivity of rights, not individualistic rights.” 
 Consequently, urban movements such as guerrilla benching, urban exploration (Garrett, 
2013) or parkour are not enacting ‘the right to the city’ (in the Lefebvrian sense) by 
attempting to ‘reclaim public space’; nor are the drinkers, smokers, shoppers or coffee 
drinkers mentioned above who linger in the public realm. All of these practices either 
fail to explicitly challenge capitalist financiers and developers hegemony over the city, 
or actively participate in perpetuating such hegemony. All of these practices involve a 
retreat into the individualistic interests of the self—be they consumption-based or 
otherwise—without creating communal social spaces based upon a collective sense of 
sociability which is concerned with challenging neoliberal capitalism’s ubiquitous 
control over the process of urbanisation, how the city is shaped and how we interact 
and relate to one another (Harvey, 2012).  
 
 
 
Developing Moral Minimalism 
 
This changing nature of the public realm runs parallel to Keith Hayward’s argument that 
there has been a ‘semiotic disambiguation between place and function’ (Hayward, 2004: 
140). Urban spaces are designed and governed to remove any sense of spatial ambiguity 
and, in the words of de Jong and Schuilenberg (2006) ‘keep space to its specificity’, in 
which space comes to have no meaning beyond its function. It is to achieve, at the street-
level of ‘lived space’, the city as it was imagined by urban planners, landowners and 
architects; what Lefebvre (1991) would have termed the ‘representation of space’ or de 
Certeau (1984) would call ‘the concept city’, as discussed below by Hayward (2012) and 
Sennett (1970):  
 
“Like a neutered, passive (spatially inverted) version of Kettling, these safe zones 
adopt an at-a-distance approach that not only results in the homogenization of the 
individual and the banishment of spontaneity or resistance from the demarcated 
space, but, like Kettles, they also provoke questions about the derealisation of 
rights and citizenship via the creation of a ‘suspended zone’. This is ultimately the 
cost of a future made certain” (Hayward, 2012: 454). 
 
“Over and over again one can hear in planning circles a fear expressed when the 
human beings affected by planning changes become even slightly interested in the 
remedies propose for their lives. “Interference,” “blocking,” an “interruption of 
work”—these are the terms by which social challenges or divergences from the 
planners’ projections are interpreted. What has really happened is that the 
planners have wanted to take the plan, the projection in advance, as more “true” 
than the historical turns, the unforeseen movements in the real time of human 
lives” (Sennett, 1970: 7).  
 
As Hayward and Sennett point out, street-level human interaction rarely appears in the 
maps and models of the urban planner’s imagined ‘concept city’. Moreover, with human 
interaction in its organic form rarely being as orderly and predictable as would be 
desirable in the ‘concept city’, these spaces are characterised by subtle forms of 
aggression, power and threat through an array of SCP measures buttressed by financial 
and legal authoritative punishments. The function of these sublimated forms of 
aggression and power is not to be covert, but extremely overt, a steady hum of the 
spatial prohibitions and threats which blend into the space through signs, CCTV 
cameras, physical barriers of wire-topped fences or gates and security guards the body 
cameras they often now wear. As Keith Hayward (2004) argues, to describe these 
spaces as exclusionary would be to misunderstand how one governs the behaviour of a 
mass of subjects through space: “For surveillance to manage its wayward subjects, to 
mould shape and ultimately ensure conformity of conduct, those subjects must be inside 
the perimeter not outside” (Hayward, 2004: 139). Such spaces operate by its subjects 
being constantly aware of a looming surveillance presence.  
However, such visibility and overt surveillance results in a paradox. While heightened 
visibility and transparency would appear to provide the basis for an open public forum 
of safe social engagement; research suggests that increased visibility actually decreases 
sociability (Drucker and Gumpert, 1991). Sennett uses the example of open-plan office 
floors, in which the walls and barriers to visibility within offices were torn down to 
increase bureaucratic efficiency. The idea is that, by visually exposing everyone to one 
another, people are less likely to gossip, chat or socialise and instead opt to keep to 
themselves. As Sennett (1977: 15) writes: “When everyone has each other under 
surveillance, sociability decreases, silence being the only form of protection”. Similar 
methods have historically been used in prisons—most famously in Jeremy Bentham’s 
panopticon—in order to successfully manage subjects through their self-regulation and 
governance without using force. (Božovič, 1995; Foucault, 1975). Moreover, when 
compounded with the new culture of narcissism which characterises, drives and is 
shaped by an ever-quickening consumer culture, the individual subject solicits the social 
retreat, finding more immediate gratification in the knowing of oneself rather than the 
knowing of others. Any system as successful as consumer capitalism has been in urban 
spaces is dependent upon an active solicitation and general acceptance of these spatial 
environments, rather than such controlling environments being predicated exclusively 
upon totalitarian control (Hall, 2012b). People accept such measures under the guise of 
‘national security’, ‘protecting the public’ (protecting the public from the public?) and 
controlling anti-social behaviour, while also accepting them due to how their spatial 
character enables smooth and efficient consumption with very little chance of an 
unsolicited human encounter. The result is a situation that is similar to the words of 
Alexis de Tocqueville:  
 
“Each person, withdrawn into himself, behaves as though he is a stranger to the 
destiny of all the others. His children and his good friends constitute for him the 
whole of the human species. As for his transactions with his fellow citizens, he may 
mix among them, but he sees them not; he touches them, but does not feel them; 
he exists only in himself and for himself alone. And if on these terms there remains 
in his mind a sense of family, there no longer remains a sense of society” 
(Tocqueville, cited in Sennett, 1977: i). 
 
These conditions arguably create what Baumgartner (1988) describes as ‘moral 
minimalism’, in which the individual is oriented around the avoidance of interaction or 
confrontation with others, adopting an averse position to the policing of one another 
through modes of formal and informal social control. In the moral minimalist order, 
there is little recourse to action based upon a higher plane of ideological or moral 
principles. The moral minimalist is exactly what it sounds like—the general 
renouncement of morally ideological principles in the policing of both the self and 
others; preferring to practice the careful and sophisticated avoidance of all problems 
unless they directly impact the self, individualising the moral order (Baumgartner, 
1988). Baumgartner contends that moral minimalism is produced and maintained by a 
pronounced fluidity in social relations, a lack of collective social integration and a 
general sense of indifference among one another. As she succinctly puts it: “it appears 
that moral minimalism is most extensive where social interaction is most diffuse…loose 
and fluid social interaction makes avoidance a simple matter: it is easy to end a 
relationship that hardly exists” (Baumgartner, 1988: 12-13).  
 
Arguably, Baumgartner’s description of moral minimalism and its underpinning social 
conditions reflect what is currently happening within the post-social non-places of the 
late modern public realm. It is not unreasonable to make the claim that, in general, we 
endure public life with the desire for unimpeded isolation and solitude from unexpected 
and uninvited social interaction from strangers. When boarding a train or a bus, we 
invariably opt to choose a pair of seats in which we can be alone, reluctantly accepting 
an unknown neighbour when the train is busy, even opting to stand in solitude if the 
journey is short. We smile and engage in the routinized but empty engagements with 
the supermarket cashier, but the charade of sociability is fleeting, fluid and without 
depth. In this way, Winlow and Hall (2013) argue that the late modern subject attempts 
to achieve full sovereignty over her immediate environment, exercising the most basic 
form of special liberty in which we have the freedom to commute in the peace of our 
own company. While Hall (2012) predominantly uses the term to describe the sense of 
privilege enjoyed by self-proclaimed ‘wealth creators’ to enact their desires, however 
harmful to others, with minimal restraint or opposition, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that it is equally pervasive throughout society. Our withdrawal into our books, phones 
and laptops in public is a scaled-down mirroring of the choices of the wealthy to 
withdraw behind the fortified walls of the gated community or rise above the realities of 
street-level to the luxury penthouse (Atkinson, 2008). As JG Ballard writes:  
“The notion of the community as a voluntary association of enlightened citizens 
has died for ever…Today we scarcely know our neighbours, shun most forms of 
civic involvement and happily leave the running of society to a caste of political 
technicians. People find all the togetherness they need in the airport boarding 
lounge and the department-store lift. They pay lip service to community values but 
prefer to live alone” (Ballard, 2000: 263). 
 
Baumgartner uses the notion of ‘moral minimalism’ to explain how the ‘moral order of 
the suburb’ avoids conflict (Baumgartner, 1988). However, this article takes a different 
view. Recent theoretical developments in ultra-realist criminology argue that it is this 
type of moral minimalism, individualism and broader culture of narcissism which 
destroys a collective belief in a socio-symbolic order and underpins the harmful 
subjectivities which are at the driving heart of crime and deviance (Hall, 2012; Hall et al, 
2008; Reiner, 2007). To briefly clarify, ultra-realism is a theoretical position builds upon 
and moves beyond a left realist Mertonian position and draws upon Žižek’s 
transcendental materialism to offer a more comprehensive conceptualisation of harmful 
subjectivities and the tensions between psychosocial drives and cultural-economic 
conditions in liberal-capitalism (Winlow and Hall, 2015). Over the past four decades, the 
development of individualistic, self-interested and potentially harmful subjectivities 
have been heavily influenced and nurtured by the cultural and global political-economic 
shifts of neoliberal consumer capitalism which, in full agreement with free-market 
ideology, have crushed collectivism and social solidarity and in its place cultivated a 
culture of competitive individualism front-and-centre of the new social order (Hall, 
2012; Smith, 2014). It is to a summary of these ideas that we must turn in order to draw 
parallels between the post-social individualistic environments created by SCP and the 
harmful subjectivities engendered by late modern liberal capitalism. 
 
Competitive Individualism and the Death of the Symbolic Order 
 
The 1980s witnessed a historical shift in the global political economy which has had 
profound and lasting impacts on post-industrial society, culture and everyday life. 
Global capitalism and neoliberal policies’ evisceration of traditional forms of industrial 
employment, identity and social and community collectivism has radically reoriented 
the late modern subject (Lloyd, 2013; Winlow and Hall, 2006). It is widely accepted that 
the traditional sites of industrial employment offered a great deal of stability and 
comprehensibility of reproductive working-class structures and cultures (Hobsbawm, 
1996, Willis, 1977). Moreover, without romanticising these industries, there is evidence 
to suggest that individuals derived solidarity, mutual understanding, political and class 
identity from them as well (Willis, 1979). However, in the wake neo-liberalism’s post-
industrial disciplining and flexibilisation of labour (Lloyd, 2013), the traditional life 
structures which have provided identity, stability and certainty—such as family, 
committed relationships, stable employment and collective politics—have been 
dismantled and discarded. As Western society has shifted away from industrial 
production and towards an economy entirely predicated on consumption, consumer 
capitalism has increasingly prompted a renunciation of any governing ideology, code, 
rules traditions or customs which might impede its functional necessity to constantly 
create new markets5.  
These shifts result in a paradox: Whilst we appear to live in a world of endless rules and 
protocols; there is no governing Symbolic Order which provides a coherent set of 
morally or ideologically-guided prohibitions, customs and approvals through which our 
individual subjectivities can come into being and act in reference to the collective 
(Winlow and Hall, 2012; see glossary in Winlow and Hall, 2013). The liberal-
postmodern renunciation of any governing ideology, codes, rules or traditions, has led 
to a deep cynicism and scepticism to any forms of collective identity. The rules, codes, 
traditions and identities of family, class, community or even relationships are viewed as 
burdensome and oppressive weights upon the unique individuality inside us all. 
However, set ‘free’ from the constraints of governing ideology, we have also been 
untethered from any sense of fixity, stability or a means of making coherent sense of our 
world. In the absence of any ‘base’, with only ourselves to rely upon and living within 
the increasingly competitive and ruthless world of liberal-capitalism, Steve Hall (2012) 
argues that such conditions have resulted in the development of harmful subjectivities 
which have, to a large degree, rejected social solidarity in favour of a competitive 
individualism which is willing to harm others to further the benefits of the self; 
mirroring, rather than differentiating from, the cultural values of neoliberalism (Hall, 
2012: 245). This is not to make a moralistic comment but to sketch out how changes in 
the political, economic and ideological landscape of post-industrial society have 
influenced the late modern subject. 
The rejection of the social and the retreat into individualism and one’s individual 
desires results in the death of a Symbolic Order which provides the balance between 
restraint and desire. The formal law forms part of this symbolic order, but the symbolic 
order also requires a degree of social agreement and a desire to act in reference to the 
social collective above the interests of the self in order to develop the informal rules and 
‘laws’ which frame harmonious social interaction (Lacan, 1997; Winlow and Hall, 2013). 
As the wider postmodernist individualism which is, to some small extent, cultivated by 
the physical and cultural design of ‘public’ life continues to pervade; it is also provides a 
challenge to the myth of the symbolic order. As Winlow and Hall (2013) note, the 
symbolic order of rules, traditions and customs do not truly exist. There are no physical 
or tangible bonds holding it in place, rather we would only act as if it exists. The 
continued existence of a shared socio-symbolic life can only exist for as long as we 
behave and interact in such a way that reproduces and reaffirms its imagined reality.  
The increasing development of individualistic subjectivities in all spheres of social, 
cultural and political life—including public life—involves a rejection of the social and 
the renunciation of the legitimacy of governing rules and ideologies; resulting a decline 
in the efficiency of the symbolic order.  
                                                          
5
 The liberalisation of violence within video games; the de-regulation of the night-time economy and its 
associated ‘moral bankruptcy’ and criminality (Hobbs et al, 2003) and changes in the now acceptable but once 
prohibited realms of gambling are all examples of this (Banks, 2013). 
The decline of the symbolic order and symbolic efficiency is significant. We can see the 
dark side of this competitive individualism in what a colleague and I have termed 
elsewhere as the ‘violent shopping’ of Black Friday sales (Raymen and Smith, 2015). In 
the context of this event of hyper-competitive consumption, any notions of civility, turn-
taking, or queuing often go out the window. The acquisition, possession and 
conspicuous display of consumer goods and identity markers is supposed to position 
the individual as a winner compared to the losers without the items. As society has 
become more individualistic and organised around a consumer society, all that is left is 
what Žižek (2002) describes as the ‘cultural injunction to enjoy’, where life is about the 
pursuit of pleasure, a pursuit to which almost all other rules, codes, ethics or morality is 
secondary.  The queue is important. It is emblematic of a larger symbolic order in which 
the desires of the self are secondary to the interests and civility of the collective. By 
rejecting the prosocial, individuals are acting in the belief that within a Randian context 
of wealth creation, individual drives and desires are prioritised, while the need to 
acknowledge the harms inflicted upon others is diminished. Ironically, this behaviour 
also occurs within the non-places of the late modern shopping mall, superstores and 
high streets.  
This is a perspective that is gaining increasing traction within left-wing criminology. 
Reiner (2007) for example, locates egoism, the Randian doctrine that individuals should 
unfalteringly do whatever is in their own self-interest, at the centre of neoliberal 
consumer culture. He cites Thatcher’s edict that people should ‘look to themselves first’, 
as the driving force of an individualistic society. Steve Hall and other colleagues develop 
this notion further, suggesting that the form of egoism that drives the kind of harmful, 
criminal and deviant behaviours that occur on both sink estates and in board rooms are 
indeed ‘deviant’, but in their cultural values are shaped by and reflect the central tenets 
of neoliberalism: hyper-competitiveness, individualism and a particular egoism which 
entails elevating the self by degrading others (Hall, 2012; Hall et al, 2008; Smith, 2014; 
Winlow and Hall, 2006; Treadwell et al, 2013).  
All of this is to problematize and draw attention to the parallels between the self-
interested competitive individualism which underpins crime and deviance and the 
moral minimalism and withdrawal from the social which is created by environments 
densely smattered with SCP and CPtED measures. We can see this in what de Cauter 
(2004) refers to as ‘capsular civilisation’: an atomised society of individuals who have 
retreated into a vast array of private capsules—both physically real and symbolic. For 
de Cauter (2004), following Sennett, public life has been reduced to moving from one 
private enclave to another, with the automobile being the foremost example of the 
private ‘capsule’. As the purchase of a vast array of personal and home protection 
products and methods for ‘shielded mobilities’ become increasingly democratised 
through the relative availability of cheap credit and the doxic commitment to lower-
prices (Harvey, 2007), increasing numbers of people have the autonomy to be in more 
control and more selective about their public encounters and how they experience 
public life (Atkinson, 2006). 
A significant counter-argument to the central premise of this article is the alleged ‘crime 
decline’ in recent years. If urban spaces are indeed becoming increasingly ‘asocial’ and 
aiding in the cultivation of subjectivities which are willing to inflict harm on others in 
order to advance the interests of the self (Hall, 2012), then why is crime, at least 
statistically, supposedly on the decline? Firstly, the validity of this supposed crime 
decline has been vociferously contested by some (Kotze and Temple, 2014), with others 
looking at the unequal social and spatial differentiation of the crime decline (Parker, 
2008). Street crime is often most densely concentrated in impoverished locales in which 
various forms of crimes and its attendant shadow economy are viewed by many as 
victimless, economically beneficial and indeed normalised, therefore rarely appearing in 
the official statistics of crime surveys (Contreras, 2013; Winlow, 2001); particularly as 
these forms of crime have become more sophisticated and mutating to become less 
detectable (Hall and Winlow, 2015). The International Crime Victims Survey looks only 
at 11 types of ‘conventional crime’ and, according to Kotze and Temple (2014) doesn’t 
always manage to penetrate high crime areas, in addition to struggling with the 
traditional challenge of uncovering the harmful practices involved with the white-collar 
realm of the finance and business industries (Horsley, 2015).  
Moreover, as Jock Young (2004) has warned, statistically-based evaluations of the 
landscape of crime and deviance fail to acknowledge the deeply socially constructed 
nature of legally-defined crime. Contemporary criminology has struggled to keep up 
with the rapidly changing zemiological field of harms which are becoming more 
pervasive and increasingly normalised in everyday life, such as the harmful behaviours 
of the night-time economy, for one example. In studying the violence associated with 
Black Friday shopping, a colleague and I witnessed several exchanges of undeniably 
criminal violence, none of which was deemed serious enough—or perhaps abnormal 
enough—to constitute arrest in the inherently individualistic and harmful realm of time-
bound competitive consumption (Raymen and Smith, 2015). There is no evidence to 
suggest that the statistical decline in crime is indicative of an improvement in social 
relations between persons, or a change in the subjective motivation to crime rooted in 
competitive individualism. Rather, as Hall (2014: 24) suggests, it is more indicative of a 
harmful culture working in harmony with the economy.  
Conclusion 
Keith Hayward’s critique of situational crime prevention focuses upon how rational 
choice theories of crime upon which SCP is based fail to incorporate emotion, 
excitement and the ‘culture of now’ which is so pervasive in late modern consumer 
society (Hayward, 2004; 2007; 2012). Hayward focuses upon how, in a consumer 
culture that needs to create new markets for consumption in order to reproduce itself, 
there has been a ‘deregulation of desire’ in late modernity which is significantly 
reconfiguring the balance between hedonism and restraint and changing the late 
modern subject’s need for constant and new forms of stimulation. This draws on 
Bauman, who describes this late modern subject as a ‘sensation-gatherer’ who is 
individualistic, competitive, narcissistic and self-interested (Bauman, 1997).  
However, what Hayward’s critique did not acknowledge was how the SCP-laden spaces 
of contemporary city centres are environments which potentially cultivate the 
individualistic, self-interested subjectivity of the ‘sensation gatherer’ who, tilted 
towards personal desire over restraint, is willing to harm others to benefit the self. The 
non-places of SCP and CPtED environments actively discourage pro-social public 
engagement, being spaces of movement which are designed to move the individual on to 
the next individualistic consumer activity—unsurprising considering that SCP is used to 
protect and govern privately owned consumer spaces. This article has modestly 
attempted to sketch out the contradictions within SCP-governed spaces, problematizing 
how environments designed and governed by CPtED and SCP are counter-productive in 
their nature: aiming to prevent crime while designing post-social non-places which 
perpetuate the asocial, individualistic subjectivities.  
De Cauter (2003) writes that “[o]ur daily life can be exactly described as a movement 
from one enclave or capsule (home for instance) to another (campus, office, airport, all-
in hotel, mall and so on)…neoliberal individualism plus suburbanization of daily life 
equals capsularization” (De Cauter, 2003: 96). What de Cauter touches on in his 
mention of neoliberal individualism is central to the arguments of this article. While this 
form of moving throughout urban space can be thought of as a cessation from the social, 
in many ways it mirrors the dominant neoliberalisation of everyday life—a microcosm 
of neoliberal ideology at the level of the individual. While SCP and CPtED are in many 
ways employed by, and caught within, the proliferation of neoliberal ideology and 
privatisation of public life, it is this political-economic ideology and its effects on 
individual subjectivities which are a significant part of the contemporary crime 
problem.  
Situational crime prevention and the individual retreat from public life is a broad topic 
which this article has applied in a fairly specific way. The point of this article has not 
been to vilify the ideas and goals of situational crime prevention and defensible spaces. 
Of course, situational crime prevention is not the definitive cause of the socially, 
politically and culturally-inspired subjective drives which underpin crime and deviance. 
The ideas of Newman (1972) have some merit. Indeed, it is often argued that the 
concept of defensible space is merely an extension of Jane Jacobs’ (1961) concept of ‘the 
eyes on the street’, in which more people on the street with different backgrounds, 
interacting with and watching over one another would result in increased safety and 
sociability as a working-living space. This idea has great merit and is the exact opposite 
of the post-social neoliberal cities discussed here. However, these fine ideas have been 
employed by the privatised consumer city based upon individualistic interests of 
accumulating capital and overly simplistic assumptions crime and criminogenic 
subjectivities. This results in a securitisation of the city which serves the purposes of 
capital accumulation rather than communal sociability in the public realm, reproducing 
and perpetuating a broader neoliberal culture of individualism. While this article is far 
from the last word on the issue, it is hoped that it prompts more critical accounts as to 
whether SCP and the cities it shapes, far from being a solution, are actively part of the 
broader crime problem.  
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